The challenges of studying the elements of diversity and unity in the human experience by Cieślarek, Paweł
I N T E R C U LT U R A L  R E L AT I O N S  ◦  R E L A C J E  M I Ę D Z Y K U LT U R O W E  ◦  2 0 1 9  ◦  2  ( 6 )
https://doi.org/10.12797/RM.02.2019.06.01
Paweł Cieślarek1
THE CHALLENGES OF STUDYING  
THE ELEMENTS OF DIVERSITY  
AND UNITY IN THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE
Abstract
The paper is a fruit of a series of informal symposiums and an elective course 
entitled “Orient–Occident”, conducted by the author in 2016 and 2019 at the 
Institute of Intercultural Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The au-
thor identifies a set of issues commonly perceived as the main challenges of 
our age and focuses specifically on the challenge of intercultural relations 
in a “globalized world” to provide a critical examination of several misconcep-
tions and conventional narratives surrounding this topic. The discussion serves 
as an introduction to a proposed approach to comparative study of texts of cul-
ture, developed primarily in the philosophical tradition and within the concep-
tual framework of the so-called New Humanism of Irving Babbitt (1865–1933) 
and combined with some additional components sourced from the works 
of Leo Strauss (1899–1973). The author argues that this approach provides 
a valuable exercise of imagination to students of culture and cultural diversity 
as it strives to strike a balance between the perception of diversity and unity 
in the human experience – a quality rarely displayed in contemporary cultural 
studies.
Key words: comparative study of cultures, humanism, Irving Babbitt, Leo Strauss, 
modern civilisation, globalisation, cosmopolitanism
1 PhD Candidate; Jagiellonian University in Kraków; ORCID: 0000-0002-9417-820X; 
pawel.cieslarek@alumni.uj.edu.pl.
PAWEł CIEŚLAREK10
Societies, cultures, and civilizations – past and present – are of-
ten incomprehensible to outsiders, but the individual’s hungers, 
anxieties, dreams, and preoccupations have remained unchanged 
through millennia . . . If in some manner the voice of an individu-
al reaches us from the remotest distance of time, it is a timeless 
voice speaking about ourselves.
Eric Hoffer (1974, p. 97)
THE CHALLENGES OF OUR AGE
It is certainly true that every age is shaped by a set of peculiar conditions 
and so faces a set of peculiar challenges. It is also true that every age has 
its special conceits. The existence of phrases such as “globalized world” 
and “multicultural world” speaks something of both challenges and con-
ceits. Whether the world of today is truly “more global” and more cultur-
ally diverse than ever before is beside the point, at least in the context of 
this paper. What is important is the fact that the concepts of global scale 
and cultural diversity inhabit our imagination.
When it comes to creating global awareness, two images come to mind 
as artefacts of special significance. The first of these is the famous Earth-
rise photograph which was taken on December 24, 1968 by the crew of 
Apollo 8, the first manned mission to circumnavigate the Moon. It shows 
the Earth, in full colour, hovering half illuminated above the crater-covered 
surface of her celestial companion. A similar picture, although black-and-
white and overall much cruder, was sent in 1966 by Lunar Orbiter 1 during 
its survey mission. Earthrise, however, was taken not by a robotic space-
craft but by living and breathing human beings, hence its symbolic signifi-
cance. The same goes for the second image, The Blue Marble, captured on 
December 7, 1972, by the crew of Apollo 17, the last manned lunar mission 
to date. Arguably, this one is even more spectacular. It shows an almost 
fully illuminated Earth from a much closer distance of about 29,000 kilo-
metres. It seems somewhat ironic that man had to venture into the outer 
space in order to truly discover his home planet, for in these two pictures 
the theme of “Spaceship Earth” received a tangible illustration.
Although the metaphor became very popular during the 1960s and 
70s, it predates, by a wide margin, the age of space exploration. Indeed, 
its origins can be traced to the second half of the 19th century, to Progress 
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and Poverty (originally published in 1879), a popular treatise on political 
economy written by Henry George (1881, p. 218). The general meaning 
of the metaphor is quite well-established, although historically it was em-
ployed in various contexts in response to shifting interests in the public 
discourse. Earth, as it were, is like a ship travelling through the vacuum of 
space. Human beings are its crew. Resources are limited and no means 
of evacuation, no lifeboats, are available at present. A safe voyage and sur-
vival depend on the crew working together, caring for one another and 
mending the ship. Originally the “Spaceship Earth” metaphor was used 
mainly to highlight the perceived injustice of the prevailing socio-economic 
order and to signal the need of change. Since we are all in this together – 
the thought seems to be – we might as well learn to get along, strive for 
social justice and mutual betterment instead of allowing the strong and 
cunning to selfishly exploit the meek and weak. As George Orwell put it in 
The Road to Wigan Pier, originally published in 1937:
The world is a raft sailing through space with, potentially, plenty of provisions 
for everybody; the idea that we must all cooperate and see to it that everyone 
does his fair share of the work and gets his fair share of the provisions seems 
so blatantly obvious that one would say that no one could possibly fail to ac-
cept it unless he had some corrupt motive for clinging to the present system. 
(Orwell, 1958, p. 203)
In the second half of the 20th century the attention shifted from the 
well-being of the crew to the technical condition of the raft itself. The met-
aphor became a rhetorical device in the context of anthropogenic risks to 
the entire planet and all its inhabitants – from the threat of a nuclear win-
ter to global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions. Wernher von 
Braun, for example, was fond of employing it in the public speeches he 
gave to praise the benefits of the space program when addressing Ameri-
can taxpayers. Since venturing into space for the sake of it might have 
seemed, to a practically-minded USA citizen, like a waste of time, money 
and effort, von Braun was keen to explain the usefulness of artificial sat-
ellites for the task of monitoring the condition of the planet from orbit. 
He invoked the “Spaceship Earth” metaphor in order to highlight the prob-
lem of finite resources available to the ever-growing population and to il-
lustrate the existential threat posed by increasing pollution of the natural 
environment:
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The 3.5 billion astronauts [in 1976] not only deplete the dwindling resources of 
spaceship Earth like drunken sailors, they also poison their life-support system 
as though they were implementing a global suicide pact. (Braun, 2007, p. 212)
Finally, the metaphor also found its place in the context of intercultur-
al relations. Here, global awareness was combined with a sense of cultural 
diversity. The crew of the ship is not unified in terms of customs, values, 
beliefs and ideals, hence they are prone to distrust, misunderstanding and 
even physical violence. Despite this, they must work together to ensure 
survival and, if possible, a fair measure of well-being. Cultural tolerance, 
therefore, becomes a necessity. To become tolerant, one must free one’s 
mind from the false absolutes of one’s own culture. This can be achieved 
by fostering a kind of anthropological sensitivity through education. As Neil 
Postman wrote in The End of Education:
. . . the subject of anthropology . . . presents to us living cultures that differ 
widely in their worldviews and therefore helps the young to defend themselves 
against idolatry and false absolutes . . . I call the Enterprise (from Star Trek) 
as a useful metaphor of what an anthropological outlook may teach. Like our 
planet itself, the Enterprise is home to a variety of groups, not all of them Earth 
people. Spock, for example, is half Vulcan, and from time to time Romulans 
and even fearsome Klingons will share space with Earth people. Of course, they 
have their own spaceships, but if we can imagine . . . that all of them had to live 
on the Enterprise, we would have a fairly accurate picture of what our situation 
is: a community of different languages, different traditions, different physiques 
(and therefore different standards of beauty), and different cosmological nar-
ratives. The following questions arise: What does each group have to know 
about the others? What knowledge would lead to harmony? What knowledge 
might lead to conflict? On what basis would any group claim superiority over 
the others? Would it be possible to create a narrative, including a set of sym-
bols, that would attract the allegiance of all groups? (Postman, 1996, p. 108)
Does this mean that the crewmembers of “Spaceship Earth” should 
renounce their respective heritages and continue their voyage under the 
banner of radical cultural relativism? Such an attempt would probably lead 
to quite an ironic outcome. Radical cultural relativism, as it is true of any 
extreme point of view, is itself a false absolute, a universalistic pluralism, or 
“a monism of universal tolerance” by virtue of asserting that “pluralism is 
the right way” (Strauss, 1997, p. 379, italics as in a source text), and as such, 
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since it requires absolute conformity, inevitably leads to conflict. Postman 
recognized this problem and offered a somewhat idealistic solution:
There is, of course, a clear ideological bias to anthropology, as there is to the 
theme of the spaceship Earth – that ignorance, distrust, and intolerance of dif-
ference are dangers to the spaceship and that anything that might be done to 
reduce them helps to ensure everyone’s survival. But I must add at once that 
such an outlook does not necessarily lead to an uncritical relativism. The Vul-
cans, as we know, take a rather bemused attitude toward the Earthlings’ ex-
cessive emotionalism. The Earthlings, for their part, are quite sure that Vulcans 
place too much value on logic and calculation. Each learns something from the 
other, which allows a measure of harmony, even affection, to exist between 
them. But each retains the belief in the essential correctness of its worldview. 
One does not have to be a cultural relativist in order to be tolerant of other 
views, at least not when survival is at stake. The Klingons would present a special 
problem, since, their culture is organized around a distrustful belligerence . . . 
The solution does not require that others accept the values of the Klingons, or 
that they regard that value as being as good as any other. The solution requires, 
first, that we recognize its existence; second, that we examine ourselves to see 
how much we are like Klingons; and third, that we try to find in Klingon cul-
ture elements of which we wholeheartedly approve. (Postman, 1996, p. 109)
Thus, when it comes to the question of securing a measure of sustain-
able, prosperous and peaceful existence on this global spaceship of ours, 
the wisdom of the age seems to be that what we need is the combined 
forces of knowledge and good will. This wisdom operates in, at least, two 
areas of experience. There is the relationship between the crew and the 
spaceship, i.e. the attitude of humans to the physical environment. Science 
and technology allow us to exploit the planet’s resources to our advan-
tage but – as we are prone to believe – also give us the power to render 
the planet inhospitable to most, if not all, forms of life, including human 
life. We need knowledge and good will to use Earth’s resources respon-
sibly. There are also the relationships among the crew members, i.e. the 
humanity in bulk. This area of experience can be further subdivided. On 
one hand, we need knowledge and good will to build – on both a national 
and international level – a system in which the fruits of human labour are 
distributed in a just manner. On the other hand, we need knowledge and 
good will – again on a national and international level – to ensure coex-
istence, as peaceful as possible, and cooperation, as fruitful as possible, 
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among individuals and groups of different interests and worldviews. In oth-
er words, well-informed mutual understanding and sympathy towards 
other human beings are supposed to be the twofold antidote to many of 
the ailments peculiar to our present existence in a world of a population 
nearing eight billion, a world tightly knit by physical and digital means of 
rapid communication, where individuals and groups of people represent-
ing disparate, sometimes irreconcilable, systems of conventional behav-
iour, values, beliefs and ideals interact within societies and across national 
borders on an unprecedented scale, a world of global risks and global op-
portunities. What we see here are the three challenges of our age, one 
environmental and two political, namely our socio-economic system and 
intercultural relations. The intercultural challenge of living on “Spaceship 
Earth” is of special interest to this paper and will be explored further.
THE WAR OF THE WORLDS
The “Spaceship Earth” metaphor, used as a rhetorical device in the context 
of intercultural relations, offers a lofty ideal of humanity united, despite cul-
tural differences, for the purpose of ensuring its own survival. A self-styled 
realist might find it hard to discern what is more nebulous: the conviction 
that the ideal is achievable via systematic initiation into an anthropological 
sensitivity or the belief that a common goal defined in abstract terms, i.e. 
an appeal to the collective interest of humanity, can truly inspire people 
to look beyond their individual interest or the interest of their particular 
group. Of course, a sound case can be made – as it was made by Post-
man – that cultural differences, when recognized, understood, and tamed, 
may conceivably turn from a hindrance into an advantage. From this point 
of view, diversity is seen not only as a source of the kind of richness that 
we like to experience to satiate our deep-seated romantic thirst for the ex-
otic but also as an invaluable resource of creative tensions. Indeed, history 
teaches us that when a civilisation is pulled in opposite directions by com-
peting attitudes toward life – as it was the case with Christiani tas, pulled 
in opposite directions by disparate concepts of truth2 – it needs not shatter 
2 In an attempt to bridge the apparent gap between revelation and philosophy, publi-
cists of conservative leanings are sometimes eager to argue that what came to be known 
as the Western civilisation emerged and achieved its greatness through a sort of fusion 
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but can, at times, produce great wisdom and great beauty, just like a tense 
string produces music. Although these attitudes may develop alongside 
one another organically within a civilisation, they are often inspired by for-
eign influence. History, however, also teaches us that contact between in-
dividuals and populations of varying customs, values, beliefs and ideals is, 
too often, a source of less creative, and more destructive tensions. There is 
also an intuitive conviction, one often contradicted by historical evidence 
and quite idealistic in its own way, that individuals, and indeed peoples, 
who are culturally similar usually find it easier to get along, while individu-
als and peoples of different cultural backgrounds tend to clash with one 
another. On a more sophisticated level of academic study this view can 
develop into a type of theory, or even a type of philosophy of history, that 
can be seen as a polar opposite of the “Spaceship Earth” metaphor, for 
although it also requires an imagination operating on a global scale, it lacks 
an optimistic attitude when it comes to the possibility of overcoming cul-
tural differences or building a sort of global “superculture” based on the 
principle of universal tolerance. Theories of this type may be dubbed 
the “war of the worlds” narratives.
A long chain of such narratives stretches from the height of the coloni-
al era in the 19th century all the way to the turbulent beginning of the 21st 
century marked by the September 11 attacks. The most influential of the 
more recent iterations is, of course, the one elaborated by Samuel Hun-
tington (1996). Huntington’s thesis, as it is well known, stands in contrast 
to Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) concept of the “end of history”. The latter 
suggested that the post-Cold War era will be shaped by an expansion of 
a set of values and ideals – human rights, liberal democracy, free market 
of “Jerusalem” and “Athens” (Shapiro, 2019, pp. xxiv–xxvii, 17). It could be argued, how-
ever, that the movement of Western intellectual history was animated by rather futile 
attempts to fully reconcile these attitudes that can exist side by side, for better or worse, 
only in a state of an uneasy tension. An attempt to merge them, finally, amounts to el-
evating one at the cost of the other with a detrimental effect to life (both theoretical and 
active). A biblical scene may be invoked to illustrate the chasm between these attitudes, 
namely the exchange between Pontius Pilate and Jesus of Nazareth over the notion of 
truth (Jn. 18:33–38). One might hesitate to interpret this as a “clash of cultures” – the 
modern notion of culture is foreign to Mediterranean antiquity (Strauss, 1997, pp. 377–
378). Some scholars, however, would readily see Pilate’s attitude as a product of Occiden-
tal intellectualism and Jesus as a religious figure representing an Oriental type of wisdom, 
Pilate as a rational sceptic and Jesus as a man of faith and moral will (Babbitt, 1924, p. 172).
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economy and the like – supposedly infused with a singular potential to be 
universally accepted and, as the final logical steps of the historical process, 
destined to engulf the entire globe and reshape all of the diverse ways of 
life and worlds of thought of its inhabitants. Huntington, conversely, ar-
gued that humanity cannot be moulded into a single global community 
by a set of values and ideals of clearly Western origin, a set of values and 
ideals that, despite the universalistic pretence, might easily be seen by 
their would-be recipients as an ideological extension of Western imperial-
ism. He speculated that what will emerge from the collapse of the bipo-
lar world of the second half of the 20th century will be a geopolitical and 
social landscape shattered along the lines of cultural, especially religious, 
differences.
Nuances aside, the crux of a “war of the worlds” narrative is straight-
forward: humanity is divided into more or less clear-cut cultural or civili-
sational blocks and the world events are shaped mainly by tensions and 
conflicts between groups of people representing different and – to a large 
extent – irreconcilable ways of life. Interaction between disparate groups 
of people is always a risky bargain. So is any attempt of creating a “mul-
ticultural society”. One may hope for fruitful exchange and mutual ben-
efits; the dangers, however, that present themselves when different, if not 
outright opposing systems of conventional norms of behaviour, values and 
ideals border one another or mix within one political entity, are real. From 
verbal misunderstandings to physical violence, from gradual social disin-
tegration to bloody wars of conquest and forceful subjugation – history is 
filled with disconcerting examples. When used in a more ideological than 
academic context, a “war of the worlds” narrative can easily work as a sort 
of conceptual engine of a rhetoric designed to rouse a type of xenophobic 
sentiment. What comes to mind are dark visions – ranging from warnings 
rooted in sound reason to hysterical call-to-arms raised by political popu-
lists – of an alien menace, of masses of invaders from without or foreign 
elements from within, threatening the very existence of the one true civi-
lisation. Today, the “barbarians at the gates of Rome” variant of the “war 
of the worlds” narrative is employed most readily in the context of peoples 
from North Africa and Middle East moving into Western countries, espe-
cially in the context of the ongoing migration crisis in Europe.
There is also the “East versus West” variant, employed, for exam-
ple, by both United States and Russia, in which the opposing parties are 
fond of styling themselves as defenders of this-or-that value or claiming 
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to represent a spiritual quality of which the opponent (in diplomatic par-
lance: “our Western partners” or “Russian friends”) is deprived of. During 
the second decade of the 21st century, however, we have become more 
accustomed to the thought of a sole pivotal process destined to shape the 
world events for decades to come – the confrontation, namely, between 
the United States, the leading Western power, and China, a mighty East-
ern dragon finally awoken from its deep slumber, ripe to reassert itself as 
a global superpower and ready to question the American hegemony. It 
may be argued, of course, that the competition between these two pow-
erhouses is primarily geopolitical in nature. Nevertheless, the rhetoric that 
surrounds it can easily by equipped with a cultural component. The United 
States, when speaking as a custodian of the global status quo established 
after the dissolution of the USSR, may style itself as a defender of presum-
ably universal values of individual freedom, democracy, and so on and so 
forth. In a different context, however, they may flip the tone and become 
the embodiment of Western values rooted in a strange mixture of Greek 
philosophy, Roman law, the so-called Judeo-Christian religious tradition, 
along with the secular wisdom of the Enlightenment. Depending on the in-
tended recipient of the narrative, universal values can reveal themselves to 
be distinctly particular while the guardian of human dignity and freedom 
can morph into a defender of the West, a bulwark against the menace of 
a collectivist tyranny of Asiatic origins.
It should be stressed that conceits of superiority – spiritual, material, 
or both – and the feeling of a way of life being besieged by inferior, yet 
cunning, more numerous or more aggressive forces are not a Western 
invention. Nor are they peculiarly modern. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1987, 
p. 38) may have dispensed with “facts” – although it is only fair to men-
tion that what he had in mind was most likely the historical account of 
the Bible – in order to put forth his influential theory of original human 
pity and the universal love that, supposedly, stems from it. Alas, the stub-
born facts of human experience, including those represented symbolically 
in biblical stories, do suggest that, throughout known history, ethnocen-
trism accompanied by xenophobia has been a normal human attitude, in-
deed, a rather primordial attitude, if not, simply, an attitude deeply rooted 
in the brute facts of our evolutionary development. In any complex soci-
ety this attitude can be used as a building block of the political ideology 
of a tribe, state, or a coalition of tribes or states. What comes to mind 
is the widespread phenomenon of adopting endoethnonyms synonymous, 
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more-or-less, with the word “human” or claims of superiority expressed in 
the very name of a political entity (e.g. tianxia of the ancient Chinese). It 
must be noted, however, that the modern era has introduced its own spe-
cial innovations and has made the “war of the worlds” narrative its own by 
infusing it with romantic sensibility and a new sense of global scale. Fur-
thermore, these two elements are accompanied by a comparatively recent 
realisation of the most basic consequences of the spread of modern sci-
ence and technology.
These include the plain fact of evening-up the odds. When looked 
upon in a broad historical context, the measure of technical superiority en-
joyed by European powers during the colonial era seems more and more 
a transient anomaly. We may view the clashing “worlds” – or the “worlds” 
may style themselves – as representing disparate ways of life, yet, since 
the beginning of the 20th century, it has become harder and harder to view 
them as being worlds apart in terms of might conjured up by advanced 
technology. The uneasiness experienced by the West of today, confronted 
by the strides of material progress made by China, is a sentiment similar 
to the one felt more than a century ago by those who expected that the 
Asiatic powers – humiliated and resentful – would soon be ready to chal-
lenge Western supremacy. The crushing defeat of the Russian Empire by 
a recently industrialized Japan during the war of 1904–1905, for example, 
served as a catalyst to some forms of the “Yellow Peril”.
The issues discussed so far amount to a peculiar conundrum. We worry 
that the same technology, which is capable, to a certain extent, of setting 
humanity free from the tyranny of nature, is also capable of destroying our 
planet. At the same time, we believe that only through technology we may 
deliver ourselves from extinction. The consensus seems to be that the best 
solution to our environmental problems would be a technological solution 
that would allow us to preserve both the fruits of material progress and the 
natural environment. Since it must be a solution implemented on a global 
scale, we need to unite the crew of “Spaceship Earth”. The crew, however, 
comprises of groups of aliens unable to overcome their differences. Here, 
we turn to lofty ideals; but we also turn to technology as means of putting 
these ideals into practice. We fear a war fought between “worlds” equally 
equipped in advanced means of horrific destruction. At the same time, we 
believe that technology can help us avert this catastrophe. On one hand, 
by bestowing as much material comfort as possible to as many human be-
ings as possible, thus removing the chief reason for resentment. On the 
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other hand, by bringing us all together through modern means of commu-
nication, thus dispersing the fog of ignorance which we believe to be the 
chief source of ethnocentrism and xenophobia.
In this context, my argument may seem somewhat controversial. 
I agree with the likes of Postman that the difficult ability to open one’s 
mind and heart to a different attitude toward life is something that we are 
very much in need of today. Since I intend to argue that comparative study 
of works of culture is a useful tool in order to exercise one’s imagination 
to that purpose, it seems that I also agree with the importance of foster-
ing a kind of anthropological sensitivity. Where I disagree, however, with 
contemporary common sense, is on the notion that what humanity must 
achieve for the purpose of the greater good is the feat of overcoming dif-
ferences, especially cultural differences. Despite more popular notions at 
hand, I would argue that what is the special challenge of our time springs 
not from clashes between irreconcilable ways of life (i.e. cultures) but from 
a certain unity – possibly a global unity – in viewing life, a paradoxical unity 
indeed, for it is a type of unity that is setting people both apart and against 
one another. It is precisely this central unity, existing amidst peripheral dif-
ferences, that we should strive to overcome. In order to do so, however, 
we must realize its existence. I believe that this difficult realisation could 
be facilitated by exercising our imagination through a certain type of com-
parative study of cultures.
THE IDEAL OF UNIVERSAL BROTHERHOOD
Although a fair amount of self-flattery is involved in the conviction that hu-
mans are “rational animals”, there is some truth to it as well. Alas, it is from 
the type of rationality that I have in mind that springs the chief impulse un-
dermining the humanitarian appeal of the “Spaceship Earth” metaphor. To 
act in one’s self-interest or in the interest of one’s group seems a rational 
course of action for a human being confronted with the ultimate danger. 
When his own life, and the life of his kin, is at stake, why should he be 
moved by an abstract concept of a threat to all humanity? When his own 
group is safe and enjoys material comfort, why should he be bothered by 
the lot of those alien to him? Finally, why should an individual or a group of 
people striving to lift themselves to what is considered a high, or simply ad-
equate, standard of living feel obliged to comply with restrictions imposed 
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on their growth by individuals and groups of people who already enjoy 
what seems to be universally desired? In other words, a vision of casting 
differences aside and working together for the common good of humanity 
seems a rather moot point. Although it has a pleasant ring to it in theory 
and may inspire new, and perhaps less ironic (but more naïve) versions of 
John Lennon’s Imagine, from the perspective of powerful individuals and 
political entities struggling for dominion over our “spaceship” and its re-
sources, it remains a sterile idealism, useful only as a rhetorical device in 
the cynical game of geopolitics. What prevails in the realm of action, it 
could be argued, is the “every-man-for-himself” attitude. It would seem, 
therefore, that in order to descend from a humanitarian dreamland, the vi-
sion of a united humanity needs to be equipped with at least a semblance 
of concrete justification to complement the awareness of global obstacles 
surmountable only by global efforts. Here, the ideal of universal brother-
hood comes into play.
In the West, the development of this ideal could be associated with 
Christian concepts of God the Creator of heaven and earth and Father to 
all creation. Looking to the East, one can find spiritual traditions even more 
consequential when it comes to inspiring a sense of oneness of all exist-
ence and the spirit of universal compassion that may spring from it. Nev-
ertheless, in many traditional religions, be they Western or Eastern, and 
whatever their metaphysical assumptions may be, one can observe a more 
or less pronounced selectiveness that is almost absent from our modern 
humanitarian ideal of universal brotherhood. Christianity, insisting on the 
grace of faith as the path to the brotherhood in Christ (Gal. 3:23–29), and 
Buddhism, prescribing a common form of strenuousness (appamāda) to 
those who strive to follow the Dhamma, however remote metaphysically, 
are similar on this central point.
It seems that a more naturalistic, pantheistic for example, religious 
outlook is more conducive to a belief in universal brotherhood achieved 
without supernatural intervention or conscious moral effort. Modern be-
lievers in universal brotherhood, however, to find an adequate rationale 
for their specific “canons of satisfaction” (Hulme, 1936, pp. 30–35), need 
not turn to religion at all, at least in the traditional sense of the word. 
They may turn to science for both reason and inspiration. Genetic re-
search and mathematical models used to map human ancestry may serve 
the purpose. Notions of “Mitochondrial Eve” and “Y-chromosomal Adam” 
come to mind as examples of scientific constructs readily appropriated 
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by moralists, or scientists turned moralists, who wish to convince others 
that, for the reason that we are all related, we should treat one another 
as family members do. What is worth mentioning is the fact that scien-
tists themselves do not shy away from spinning their findings to satisfy 
the humanitarian attitude. In a letter published in Nature in 2004, a group 
of scientists, after a couple of pages of precise analysis of a set of com-
puter simulations, concluded that the most recent common ancestor of 
all living humans “lived in the relatively recent past – perhaps within the 
last few thousand years”, most likely somewhere in eastern Asia. This 
is – of course – a very interesting finding. What I find equally interesting, 
however, is the hue of a moral statement visible in the very last sentence 
of the letter:
But to the extent that ancestry is considered in genealogical rather than ge-
netic terms, our findings suggest a remarkable proposition: no matter the lan-
guages we speak or the colour of our skin, we share ancestors who planted rice 
on the banks of the Yangtze, who first domesticated horses on the steppes of 
the Ukraine, who hunted giant sloths in the forests of North and South Amer-
ica, and who laboured to build the Great Pyramid of Khufu. (Rohde, Olson 
& Chang, 2004, p. 565)
It is hard to escape the impression that what one encounters here is 
a part of a moral, rather than scientific, equation. The proposition should 
inspire us – the suggestion seems to be – to look beyond accidental differ-
ences, both physical and cultural, and realize, in the fashion of Gandhi, that 
all humanity is one family.
It remains a secret what kind of alchemy may turn a scientific expla-
nation of a certain state of things into a convincing rationale for a certain 
moral behaviour. The expectation that the awareness of a shared geneal-
ogy should inspire people to overcome their differences is somewhat tenu-
ous. Why should it bear fruits on a global scale when it does not work on 
a scale of what is conventionally recognized as family relations? The reader 
will forgive – I hope – the following truism: conflicts among blood rela-
tives are not unheard of. Furthermore, historically speaking, familial bonds 
served as a spur for domestic and international political strife at least as 
often as they served as a bridle for it. What comes to mind, for exam-
ple, is the hope that familial bonds between monarchs of Europe would 
somehow prevent the violent implosion of the international order of the 
Belle Époque. The implosion occurred in 1914, when, unsurprisingly, cold 
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political and military calculations trumped the sense of kinship shared by 
the ruling houses, just as the nationalistic sentiment prevailed over the fra-
ternal spirit that was supposed to unite the European workers in a general 
strike against capitalistic oppression and militant imperialisms.
In the years immediately preceding the Great War, many also believed 
that the danger of a full-scale military confrontation would be averted, 
because the European states shared too many connections – economic, 
cultural, etc. In other words, in the “globalized” world of the Belle Époque 
there were those who believed that the prospect of universal progress 
achieved through international cooperation would triumph over the pros-
pect of achieving national goals through confrontation. The sense of Euro-
pean unity, however, quickly dissolved. In hindsight, although we may see 
the Great War as a result of bickering and competition between European 
nations of similar cultural background, it should be remembered how read-
ily the allied propaganda employed the “war of the worlds” narrative to it. 
Scientific and cultured Germans became the barbaric “Huns” and the west-
ern allies – defenders of civilisation. From the German perspective (elabo-
rated in Der Aufruf ‘An die Kulturwelt!’ manifesto from 1914), on the other 
hand, the war was pictured as a conflict in defence of an aspiring Kultur 
surrounded by aggressors.
It is hard, then, to view a sense of human brotherhood, however im-
agined, as a foundation for the vision of a united “Spaceship Earth” to 
build upon. The same can be said of the hope that tightening material ties 
through commerce and technology could help us disperse the fog of igno-
rance that breeds distrust and conflict. What comes to mind is the famous 
passage by Henry David Thoreau:
We are in great haste to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to Texas; 
but Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate. Either 
is in such a predicament as the man who was earnest to be introduced to a dis-
tinguished deaf woman, but when he was presented, and one end of her ear 
trumpet was put into his hand, had nothing to say. As if the main object were 
to talk fast and not to talk sensibly. We are eager to tunnel under the Atlantic 
and bring the old world some weeks nearer to the new; but perchance the first 
news that will leak through into the broad, flapping American ear will be that 
the Princess Adelaide has the whooping cough. (Thoreau, 1854, pp. 57–58)
To bring the discussion back to the supposed moral implication of 
the above-mentioned Nature letter, we can complement Thoreau with an 
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anecdote about Irving Babbitt (1865–1933), a Harvard professor and the 
leader of the so-called New Humanism movement. In a book of recollec-
tions, one of the authors (Manchester, 1941, p. 133) contributed the fol-
lowing souvenir:
When, speaking of my return journey to the Middle West, I mentioned stop-
ping on the way to visit relatives, “That is all very well,” he [Babbitt] said, suc-
cinctly, “provided you have anything in common with them.”
This may seem a harsh thing to say to a man who simply wanted to 
visit his family. Babbitt’s reply, however, is magnificently sober and points 
to an important question: what type of connection, or unity, truly brings 
people together?
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CULTURES  
AS AN EXERCISE OF IMAGINATION
To explore this issue, we may turn to an essay by Babbitt entitled Buddha 
and the Occident. Designed to relate the spiritual wisdom of early Bud-
dhism to the Christian tradition of the West and contrast both with the 
expansive attitude towards life characteristic of Western modernity and 
readily adopted throughout the world, it was published posthumously 
and intended as an introduction to Babbitt’s translation of the Dhamma-
pada. It opens with the following words:
The special danger of the present time would seem to be an increasing mate-
rial contact between national and racial groups that remain spiritually alien. 
(Babbitt, 1936, p. 513)
Bearing in mind the fact that the essay was penned more than eighty 
years ago, one may assume that what he encounters here is an early-20th-
century specimen of the “war of the worlds” narrative. It would also be 
easy to dispense with this remark as an introduction to a “barbarians at the 
gates of Rome” diatribe uttered by an epigone of the Anglo-Saxon “genteel 
tradition”. Both intuitions, however, would miss the mark. Although it is 
true that here and elsewhere Babbitt pointed to potential dangers of mate-
rial closeness and spiritual alienation (Babbitt, 1908, pp. 95–96), the “would 
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seem to be” qualification suggests that he treated the problem not pri-
marily in terms of what we understand today as intercultural relations.
On the surface, the thought seems very familiar and still current. Ma-
terial closeness combined with ethnocentric ignorance and xenophobia is 
one of the greatest threats to peace, progress and harmonious coexistence 
in a “globalized”, “multicultural” world. Babbitt, however, was adamant in 
stating that knowledge and sympathy – the chief virtues professed by 
those who embrace the cosmopolitan spirit – are not enough to truly com-
mune with each other:
The modern cosmopolitan is to be blamed not for developing on a magnifi-
cent scale the virtues of expansion [e.g. scientific knowledge and universal 
sympathy] but for setting up these virtues as a substitute for the virtues of 
concentration. He would have us believe that every man can fly off on his own 
tangent, and then in some mysterious manner, known only to romantic psy-
chology, become every other man’s brother; and that the same process can 
be repeated on the national scale. There may after all be something in the 
traditional idea that in order to come together men need to take on the yoke 
of a common discipline. (Babbitt, 1912, pp. 27–28)
A belief that differences of outlook can be reconciled by sympathy is at 
best a form of wishful thinking. At worst, it breeds a somewhat tyrannical 
attitude. A cultural relativist is forced to base his attitude on a statement 
that no one culture can claim superiority of its values, beliefs and ideals, 
yet in order to do so he must be thoroughly convinced that his values, be-
liefs and ideals of cultural relativism are in fact both absolute and supe-
rior, and that the world would be better off if his attitude was universally 
adopted. As I suggested earlier, such an attitude, in practice, very much 
resembles what would seem to be its opposite – ethnocentrism. This could 
be added to Babbitt’s list of conceits of superiority as chief obstacles to 
a better understanding between cultures – especially cultures convention-
ally, and somewhat artificially, as Babbitt was keen to add, grouped as be-
longing to the West on the one hand and to the East on the other (Babbitt, 
1936, pp. 513–515).
Babbitt was a careful student of the 19th-century epoch of expansion 
that bred legions of individuals who believed that scientists and progres-
sive intellectuals would form an avant-garde of human brotherhood, an 
international community, a church, as it were, preaching the gospel of 
material and moral progress achieved through science, technology and 
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sympathy. He sharply contrasted their illusions and disillusions with what 
he considered to be a premodern type of spiritual cosmopolitanism:
. . . literature that expressed the mind of the Middle Ages was in the highest 
degree cosmopolitan, but cosmopolitan in the older and what may turn out to 
be the only genuine sense – that is, it rested primarily on a common discipline 
and not on a common sympathy. [Ernest] Renan . . . dreams of an international 
fraternity of savants, “an empyrean of pure ideas, a heaven in which there is 
neither Greek nor barbarian, neither German nor Latin.” Saint Paul in the pas-
sage that Renan is here paraphrasing says that these and like distinctions dis-
appear for those who have become “one in Christ.” Now Christ, for Saint Paul, 
is evidently the living intuition of a law that is set above the ordinary self; by 
taking on the yoke of this law men are drawn together as to a common cen-
tre. Renan’s notion that simply by collaborating in the expansion of scientific 
knowledge men can achieve the union that, according to Saint Paul, is only 
to be achieved by spiritual concentration, may turn out to be Utopian; and it 
is the fate of the utopist to suffer sudden and severe disillusions. Renan had 
his disillusion in 1870. He expected the new Christ to come from Germany, as 
someone has put it, and instead he got Bismarck . . . “Let us suppress these un-
healthy outbursts of national self-love,” cries Renan. But in the name of what 
principle? In a crisis, the altruistic impulse either towards other individuals or 
towards other nations is likely to seem to most men pale and unsubstantial 
compared with the putting forth of personal or national power. (Babbitt, 1912, 
pp. 26–27, my italics)
Babbitt saw the ideal of human brotherhood based on universal sym-
pathy as nothing more than a “romantic chimera”. Real brotherhood is not 
a feeling or an instinct, it is a difficult path of deliberate action that brings 
similar fruits to those who follow it. In practice, spiritual alienation springs 
not from ignorance or a misunderstanding of the beliefs and values of oth-
ers but from the act of moving – via an intricate interplay between will, 
imagination and reason – in opposite spiritual directions.
At this point, we may return to the “would seem to be” qualification 
from the first paragraph of Buddha and the Occident. In a way, Babbitt fi-
nally refutes the idea that spiritual alienation combined with material close-
ness is one of the special dangers of the present age. The true danger is 
that, with gradual disintegration of traditional religious and humanistic dis-
ciplines through which – as Edmund Burke (2003, p. 67) claimed – a civilized 
life is born and maintained, humanity will uniformly adopt a thoroughly 
expansive attitude towards life bereft of an ethical centre or a “principle of 
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control” that is set above the ordinary, impulsive life of a human as a part 
of phenomenal nature and bestows on him a sense of humility and meas-
ure. In effect, individuals and groups of people would be, indeed, spiritual-
ly alienated. This alienation, however, would result from an eccentric path 
shared by humanity despite superficial differences of culture. The cosmo-
politan spirit that supposedly permeated the literature – as well as the art 
and philosophy – of medieval Europe was, in Babbitt’s mind, a corollary 
of a spiritual orientation that brought the diverse continent into a form of 
unity. This unity – a common sense expressed in works of creative imagina-
tion – was at the root of a set of conventions that amounted to what may 
be called the Christian civilisation. Babbitt did not paint a utopian picture 
of Europe in the Middle Ages. It was populated and governed by human 
beings, not by angels, and had to endure its share of stupidity, violence and 
misery. Not an insignificant amount of medieval horrors sprung from the 
“crusader spirit”, namely, the attempts “to achieve spiritual ends collec-
tively through the machinery of the secular order” (Babbitt, 1924, p. 285) 
and from various forms of “theological terror” (Babbitt, 1940, pp. 76–79) – 
i.e. more or less extreme attempts to restrict the restless movement of 
the human imagination by the chains of unwavering dogma. At their best, 
however, medieval men were imaginatively equipped to grasp and sym-
bolically express “the living intuition of a law that is set above the ordinary 
self”, a law that draws those who perceive it to “a common centre”. With-
out any equivalent of such a perception, humanity – equipped, as it is at 
present, with an unprecedented measure of power and control over the 
physical realm – is in danger of self-destruction. In 1924, Babbitt offered an 
assessment of the condition of the Occidental man that holds true to this 
day, with an important caveat that it is no longer limited to the Western 
nations, as it is equally true of the powerful global players from every cor-
ner of the world:
. . . the power of Occidental man has run very much ahead of his wisdom. The 
outlook might be more cheerful if there were any signs that Occidental man 
is seeking seriously to make up his deficiency on the side of wisdom. On the 
contrary, he is reaching out almost automatically for more and more power. If 
he succeeds in releasing the stores of energy that are locked up in the atom – 
and this seems to be the most recent ambition of our physicists – his final 
exploit may be to blow himself off the planet. We are told that our means of 
destruction are growing so terrible that no one will venture to use them – the 
same argument that was heard before the [Great] War. But at the same time 
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that we are heaping up these means of destruction, the breakdown of the tra-
ditional controls combined with the failure thus far to supply any adequate 
substitute, is creating fools and madmen who will not hesitate to use them. 
(Babbitt, 1924, pp. 143–144)
In other words, our “spaceship” may turn out to be inhabited and gov-
erned by a primitive species of tribal and territorial apes equipped with 
advanced means of terrific destruction. From biotechnology to AI, the list 
of potentially fatal exploits has grown in the past one hundred years and, 
as of yet, no “substitute for the traditional controls” has been found, un-
less one is to believe in the transformative power of some humanitarian 
rhetoric of the type outlined in this paper.
Babbitt was neither, it should be stressed, an advocate of traditional-
ism, nor a sectarian. In the last paragraph of Buddha and the Occident he 
went as far as to suggest that “persons of positive and critical temper” may 
better appreciate Christian insights by comparing them with the teachings 
of early Buddhism, a spiritual tradition comparatively more reliant on im-
mediate experience than dogma. Doctrinal divergencies aside, both tradi-
tions – Babbitt claimed (1936, p. 97) – are in “psychological agreement”. 
Although he was an “eclectic philosopher”, drawing inspiration from vari-
ous – and seemingly remote – traditions, he stressed that his method did 
not amount to an “eclectic philosophy” (Babbitt, 1932, pp. xxxiv–xxxvii). 
He would probably see himself as an exponent of what he described as 
genuine cosmopolitanism. He also professed to be thoroughly positive and 
critical; sceptical of all authority and dogma, he scanned the “wisdom of 
the ages” in search of “psychological” and “experiential” truth hidden in 
traditional symbols adopted by disparate cultures and civilisations:
A student of the past cannot help being struck by the fact that men are found 
scattered through different times and countries and living under very differ-
ent conventions who are nevertheless in virtue of their insight plainly mov-
ing towards a common centre . . . In the writings attributed to Confucius one 
encounters, mixed up with much that is almost inconceivably remote from us, 
maxims that have not lost their validity to-day; maxims that are sure to be re-
affirmed wherever and whenever men attain to the level of humanistic insight. 
In the oldest Buddhist documents again one finds along with a great deal that 
is very expressive of ancient India, and thus quite foreign to our idiosyncra-
sy, a good sense which is even more imaginative and inspired, and therefore 
more universal, than that of Confucius, and which is manifested, moreover, 
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on the religious rather than on the humanistic level. We are dealing here with 
indubitable facts, and should plant ourselves firmly upon them as against 
those who would exaggerate either the constant or the variable elements in 
human nature. (Babbitt, 1919, pp. 175–176)
What we have here is a proposition that comparative study of cul-
tures may very well be the key to open our modern – at once naturalistic 
and humanitarian – imagination to a truly different point of view, a point 
of view shared by individuals scattered across time and space, expressed 
through local symbols and in various historical contexts. We only need to 
know what to look for – not for romantic thrills of the transient and the 
exotic but for a perception of a certain “oneness that is always changing” 
(Babbitt, 1919, p. xiii). In other words, and to paraphrase Leo Strauss (1994, 
p. 329), when comparing the wisdom of other cultures and ages to the wis-
dom of our own culture and age, we must be prepared to learn something 
not merely about this wisdom but also from it.
THE CHALLENGE OF ATTITUDE
Strauss (1994, p. 329) distinguished two types of understanding the phi-
losophers of the past: unhistorical and historical. The latter is an attempt 
to understand an earlier philosopher exactly as he understood himself. 
The former is based on a presupposition that it is possible to understand 
an author of the past better than he understood himself. This presupposi-
tion can be expressly stated or held unconsciously and reveals itself in at-
tempts to assess the contribution of an earlier author to “the treasure of 
knowledge and insight which has been accumulated throughout the ages” 
(Strauss, 1994, p. 322). It is a belief that the “collective insight” available 
today is superior to the “collective insight” of the past. From this point of 
view, history is treated as a cumulative progress not only in science and 
technology but also in philosophy, literature and art. 
We cannot – wrote Strauss – be seriously interested . . . in the past, if we know 
beforehand that the present is, in the most important respect, superior to the 
past. (Strauss, 1994, p. 323)
This potentially leads to treating the views expressed in the past 
as merely a preparatory stage for the modern outlook. An attempt at 
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historical understanding is not necessarily the best way to solve this prob-
lem. Its intention is to understand the past in its own terms. The intention, 
however, is contradicted by practice. A historicist, like a cultural relativist, 
must assume that all views are equally true in the sense that they express 
the truth of the time and place of their origin. In the context of history of 
philosophy, this leads to an assumption that a thinker always expresses the 
spirit of his epoch. A thinker might have claimed to have found the truth 
(not merely a truth of his time) but a historicist knows beforehand that all 
thinkers who made such a claim were mistaken (Strauss, 1994, p. 324). As 
it was the case with the unhistorical understanding, the historical under-
standing of this type reveals itself as operating on an assumption of superi-
ority of the modern insight over the insights of past epochs.
With some caution, we may extend these comments to include not 
only the discipline of history of philosophy but also the comparative study 
of cultures. Not only philosophy but also myths, religious beliefs and litera-
ture (that used philosophies, myths and religious beliefs as its material) may 
be seen as expressions of a spirit of an age on the one hand and as more 
or less deliberate attempts at expressing some universal truth of human 
experience on the other. From our modern point of view, it is easy to dis-
miss the latter pretence by stating, for example, that this-or-that notion 
held by people living in a given time and place cannot be true because it 
is contrary to what we know today. Since a given notion cannot be true in 
this respect, its interpretation must assume that it served some function. 
Revealing it can be used to learn something about these people, some-
thing that they most likely did not know about themselves. This approach 
seems characteristic of attempts at viewing the past through the lenses of 
modern constructs or viewing various cultures through the lenses of con-
structs specific to Western modernity, e.g. the ideas of history as progress, 
class warfare, subjugation and emancipation of marginalized groups, etc. 
This attitude is also visible in attempts at causal explanations of forms of 
culture as products of socio-economic conditions or pressures from the 
natural environment. All these approaches may produce useful knowledge. 
Strauss, however, suggested a different strategy. “To take a serious teach-
ing seriously – he wrote – one must be willing to consider the possibil-
ity that it is simply true” (Strauss, 1994, p. 324). In the context of history 
of philosophy, this forces the student to assume that earlier philosophy is 
in some important respect superior to modern philosophy. This does not 
necessarily mean that he will fall into a trap of progressivism à rebours, 
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although the danger of erecting a regressive utopia certainly exists. He 
has, however, much to gain here. He can turn his attention to the past with 
hope of discovering something truly new – an unknown attitude toward 
life; “he embarks on a journey whose end is completely hidden from him: 
he is not likely to return to the shore of his time as the same man who left 
it” (Strauss, 1994, p. 325). The same may be applied to a practitioner of 
comparative study of cultures – past and present. As mentioned before, 
this means – in the field of history of culture as well as in the context of 
contemporary studies of cultural diversity – a readiness to learn not mere-
ly about others but also from others.
In the spring semester of 2016, I had a pleasure to conduct a series 
of informal symposiums entitled “Orient–Occident” with a small group of 
students at the Institute of Intercultural Studies of the Jagiellonian Uni-
versity in Kraków. In the spring semester of 2019, I covered parts of the 
same material in a form of a similarly named elective course. Although 
these meetings were devoted to close reading of texts sourced from vari-
ous cultures, the title of the whole endeavour was a deliberate misdirec-
tion on my part. The material included the following sources paired for the 
purpose of comparative analysis: Ibn Tufail’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān and Daniel 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe; The Dhammapada and Saint Paul’s Epistle to the 
Romans (complemented by fragments of The Imitation of Christ); Ana-
lects and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Obviously, describing this eclectic 
reading list as consisting of texts representing “Orient”, on the one hand, 
and “Occident”, on the other, is rather controversial. It would be impos-
sible to treat a philosophical novel written in the 12th century by an Arab 
Andalusian Muslim polymath, a Buddhist scripture from the Pāli Canon and 
a collection of sayings attributed to Confucius as belonging to connected 
cultural traditions, not to mention the fact that only the latter two of these 
texts may be described as of eastern origin (in terms of geography). Stu-
dents quickly realized that the “Occidental” part of the list may be criti-
cized in a similar fashion, thus a deliberate use of stereotypes created an 
opportunity to question some preconceived notions. Firstly, the notion of 
a tradition stretching from “Plato to NATO” that forms a coherent attitude 
towards life and can be contrasted with other, non-Western, attitudes. 
Secondly, the notion that this attitude is native to men and women who 
identify themselves, or can be labelled, as “Westerners”. This allowed us 
to change our perspective. We were trying to approach each pair of texts 
as comparative students of human experience – human relation to nature, 
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society and the supernatural – expressed in various forms by individual im-
aginations shaped by accidents of history and culture. Presenting, in full 
detail, the approach and method animating the course would require an 
exposition much longer than the space permitted by this paper. For this 
reason, I will limit myself to some preliminary considerations.
It would be difficult to overstate the cultural importance of The Life 
and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe. In the last 300 years, this novel, origi-
nally published in 1719, provided inspiration for countless adaptations 
and commentaries. Its literary qualities aside, the value of Defoe’s work 
is measured by the force with which the peripeties of the sailor from York 
resonate through the centuries. Robinson, not interested in settling on the 
“middle station” of life, embarked on a set of dangerous adventures. Fol-
lowing his instinctive drive, he finally reached what seemed to be the end 
of his journeys. He found himself removed from society and stranded on 
a desert island – an ample punishment for his crimes against good reason 
and the will of his father. The island became both his prison and his idyll, 
as well as a land ripe and ready for conquest. He executed God’s com-
mand of subduing the earth in a peculiarly modern, i.e. Baconian, fashion 
by harnessing his will and aptitudes to take command of the surrounding 
environment. He not only survived but also made himself as comfortable 
as possible. When, after almost 30 years, he managed to escape the island, 
he left his estate thriving and settled by colonists. Through the course of 
his life, he never managed to conquer his own passions. Instead of shaping 
himself, he shaped the world according to his needs and desires. His ad-
ventures became an ingredient of one of the most important metaphors of 
the modern imagination. “The legend of the island”, according to Czesław 
Miłosz (2009, pp. 29–39), is one of the “legends of modernity”.
Defoe might have been inspired to write his novel by a 12th-century 
philosophical work, Ibn Tufail’s Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, which was translated into 
Latin and English in the second half of the 17th and at the beginning of 
the 18th century. Although Robinson Crusoe differs from its predecessor in 
terms of plot, both share many similarities. Their goal is, to a large extent, 
didactic – to show what a human being can achieve without society. Both 
authors turn to similar devices. They place their heroes on a desert island 
and meticulously describe details of their everyday life. When comparing 
the outcome of Ibn Jakzan’s and Robinson’s efforts, we encounter an in-
teresting disparity. The former conquered himself and became a perfect 
philosopher, the latter conquered the external natural world and built 
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a material civilisation. This central difference is highlighted by the back-
ground of peripheral similarities and connections. A comparative study of 
both texts as products of disparate types of imagination shaped in differ-
ent times, places and cultural contexts can lend one a key to understand 
the differences between the minds of peoples to whom Ibn Tufail and De-
foe directed their tales. In a wider context, it can be useful in understand-
ing the crucial difference between the medieval and the modern approach 
to life (Strauss, 1994, p. 330).
Investigating central differences between superficially similar works of 
creative imagination can prove to be a fruitful method of studying the in-
tercultural life of texts of culture and provide guideposts in the difficult 
task of grasping the central elements shaping the minds of individuals rep-
resenting disparate communities. The method of comparative study of 
texts of culture, however, cannot stop at this point. It can be used to ob-
serve not only central differences on the background of peripheral similari-
ties but also central similarities between minds shaped by disparate exter-
nal conditions.
“If a one man conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and 
if another conquers himself, he is the greatest of conquerors”, we read in 
the ancient Dhammapada (1936, p. 18). A similar thought may be found 
in the medieval Imitation of Christ: “Who hath a greater combat than 
he that laboreth to overcome himself?” (Thomas à Kempis, 1980, p. 29). 
When it comes to time and place of origin, cultural and natural environ-
ments as well as the metaphysical notions underlining their respective 
doctrines, these texts are divided by a chasm. If, however, we study the 
practical aspects of their teachings and turn our attention to the vision of 
inner work and fruits that it supposedly delivers, we can hear both speak-
ing in one voice. They may drift apart on the currents of the constant flux 
of life and culture, but are brought close to one another by a common 
quality of intuition that looks beyond the veil of change and relativity.
The richness and variety of conventions that impose disparate and 
mutually incomprehensible – as we often tend to believe – forms on hu-
man life is truly bewildering. Sometimes, however, we encounter individ-
uals who share common intuitions and are moving in a similar direction. 
This sense of oneness that seeks to be expressed in an infinite variety of 
forms, that one may experience while studying the great works of cul-
ture, prompted Ralph Waldo Emerson to confess that he was “struck . . . 
by the appearance, that one person wrote all the books . . . there is such 
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equality and identity both of judgment and point of view in the narrative, 
that it is plainly the work of one all-seeing, all-hearing gentleman” (Emer-
son, 1844, p. 253). Today, such openness to the element of oneness is not 
a type of sensibility most commonly found in the field of cultural studies, 
where enthusiasm for diversity takes precedence. It seems, however, that 
both attitudes are indispensable. The intuition of the One orients our at-
tention to the universal elements of human experience. The intuition of 
the Many allows us to see these elements as they appear in the phenom-
enal world – expressed in transient forms specific to a given time, place 
and culture.
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